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 1 Introduction1
Even in the age of globalization international trade is hampered by trade costs. These
arise from multiple sources and, although they have decreased markedly over the last
half century, are still far from negligible. Anderson and van Wincoop (2004, pp. 3-4),
for example, estimate that the tax equivalent of trade costs for industrialized countries
amounts to 170%, which roughly breaks down into 21% transportation costs, 44% border
related trade barriers, and 55% local retail and distribution costs. In all three respects,
these costs are even larger in the case of less developed countries.
Trade costs are central to trade theory in so far as it focuses on the positive and
normative eects of trade liberalization. Standard models, however, generally fail to
acknowledge the possible dierent impacts of dierent types of trade costs.2 In particular,
as argued by Deardor (1984, p.470), the specicities of transport costs have usually been
almost completely ignored:
\[:::] like frictions in physics, transport costs are almost universally ignored in trade
models in the sanguine hope that if included they would not materially aect the
results."
Three reasons explain this neglect. First, trade theory has focused almost universally on
the most `visible' costs of trading goods internationally, namely tari and tari-equivalent
barriers. These oer an attractive subject to study, because they are determined by trade
policy and are, therefore, endogenous to the process of economic decision making. In fact
governments can change them instantaneously. Partly as a result, detailed tari data are
available for most countries, which makes empirical investigation relatively easy. This
1We wish to thank two anonymous referees, Takashi Akamatsu, Johannes Br ocker, Masa Fujita, Nils
Happich, Philippe Monfort, Pierre M. Picard, Yasuhiro Sato, Jens S udekum, Yves Zenou and participants
at the \Summer Workshop for Trade and Location" in Kiel (Germany), and the \International Symposium
on Spatial Economics and Transportation" in Sendai (Japan) for valuable comments and suggestions.
Kristian Behrens gratefully acknowledges nancial support from the European Commission under the
Marie Curie Fellowship MEIF-CT-2005-024266. Gianmarco Ottaviano gratefully acknowledges nancial
support from MIUR. Takatoshi Tabuchi gratefully acknowledges nancial support from the Japanese
Ministry of Education and Science (Grant-in-Aid for Science Research 13851002 and 18203012). The
views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reect those of the Bank of
Italy. The usual disclaimer applies.
2Empirical works usually disaggregate transport and trade costs in order to assess their relative in-
uence on the structure and evolution of world trade (see, e.g., Baier and Bergstrand, 2001). In this
respect, theory lags behind empirics.
3contrasts starkly with the time and resources required to aect transport costs as well as
with the sparse availability of the corresponding data (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2004).
Second, often causing problems of equilibrium indeterminacy, transport costs are dicult
to include in the paradigm of perfect competition that represents the backbone of trade
theory (Falvey, 1976; Cassing; 1978). Third, when it comes to imperfectly competitive
models, there is a widespread belief that the dierent components of trade costs can
be reduced without loss of generality to a single parameter. Samuelson's (1954) iceberg
approach, later used in most of trade theory and economic geography, provides a neat
illustration of how a unique parameter subsumes all the impediments to trade, including
tari barriers and transport costs (Helpman and Krugman, 1985; Fujita et al., 1999). The
underlying assumption is that all the components of trade costs aect industry location
and trade patterns in the same way.
The `equivalence assumption' of taris and transport costs is problematic for several
reasons. Most naturally, taris generate revenues whereas transport costs do not, so their
impact on welfare is bound to be generally dierent. Yet, there are more subtle issues
that are not tied to considerations of tari proceeds. Behrens et al. (forthcoming) have
recently shown that international trade costs and national transport costs have quite
dierent impacts on the location choices of mobile rms, since they aect prices and
prots dierently. In this paper, we develop these results further and show that changes
in international transport costs and changes in border related trade frictions (e.g., taris,
standards and regulations) usually have dierent impacts on the location of rms, the
structure of trade, and the welfare of nations. The main reason we highlight in the
present paper is that transportation must occur along some given transport routes and
is subject to international arbitrage by prot maximizing agents. While arbitrage also
partly occurs for taris, since large rms may go multinational in order to jump tari
barriers, the impact of taris on the location of exporting rms is more complicated to
analyze as `routes' do not generally exist in this case.
Building on the M-country version of Krugman's (1980) model, as developed by
Behrens et al. (2005), we investigate the positive and the normative impacts of deeper
international integration. To do so, we use an approach that blends aspects of new trade
theory and transport economics. In particular, while following the iceberg approach, we
use a more realistic description of geography by assuming that the transportation infras-
tructure between countries is represented by a network along which shipping must occur.
Stated dierently, countries are no longer oating islands in some abstract space, but
are now characterized by their address in the transportation network. Such an approach
4allows us to break down trade costs into a transport component and a non-transport com-
ponent. Shipping goods between any two countries in the network then incurs both: (i)
transport costs, which are associated with the shortest path between the two countries;
and (ii) non-transport costs, such as taris and non-tari border barriers, which are mod-
eled as country-pair specic ad valorem barriers in the usual way. Our approach naturally
leads to a graph representation of the space economy. This is a major departure from
existing multi-country trade models (e.g., Behrens et al., 2005), because it explicitly takes
into account the fact that shipping occurs along particular routes which have a concrete
structure in the geographical space.
Our analysis reveals that changes in transport and non-transport costs have quite dif-
ferent eects on the location of rms, the structure of trade, and the welfare of nations.
On the one hand, non-transport costs generally have a global impact as changes in one
country's barriers induce feedbacks that aect the location of rms in the global econ-
omy. Formally, the bilateral trade cost matrix in the M-country case consists of M  M
independent parameters. Thus, even in the simplest case with just three countries very
limited general results are available. On the other hand, changes in transport costs gen-
erally have only a local impact as feedbacks have a steep distance decay. The intuition
behind these results is that non-transport costs work as if there were direct links between
any pair of countries; whereas transportation occurs along specic routes so that many
pairs of countries do not have direct links (and a `triangle inequality' naturally applies to
indirect links). Formally, the bilateral transport cost matrix in the M-country case con-
sists of less than M M independent parameters and has a special structure that derives
from the properties of the transportation network and the associated network metric. It
is precisely the interposition of other countries that weakens the feedbacks between non-
adjacent countries and makes the eects of changing transport costs localized. Although
general results for an arbitrary transport network do not exist, we show that clear-cut
results can be derived for transportation improvements in parts of the network that have
locally a tree-structure. In particular, any decrease in transport costs constitutes in this
case a Pareto improvement in the global economy.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and
Section 3 lays out the spatial structure of the economy. Sections 4 and 5 investigate the
impacts of an increase in the freeness of trade. In these two sections, to disentangle the
various eects and obtain clear-cut results, we distinguish between reductions in non-
transport costs and reductions in transport costs, respectively. We show that, when the
transportation network can be locally described by a tree, the latter case allows for clear
5predictions whereas again nothing can be said in general in the former case. Section 6
concludes and suggests future research directions.
2 The model
Our model is a multi-country extension of Krugman's (1980) model. Consider a world
with M > 2 countries, subscripted by i = 1;2;:::;M. Each country is endowed with
an exogenously given mass of Li workers-consumers, each supplying inelastically one unit
of labor. Hence, both the world population and the world labor endowment are xed at
L 
P
i Li.3 Labor is the only production factor and it is internationally immobile.
2.1 Preferences
Consumer preferences of a representative agent in country j are dened over a homoge-



















In the above expressions, Hj stands for the consumption of the homogeneous good and
Dj for the (aggregate) consumption of the dierentiated good; dij(!) for the consumption
of variety ! when it is produced in country i; and 
i for the set of varieties produced in
that country. The parameter  > 1 measures both the own- and cross-price elasticities of
demand for any variety of the dierentiated good.








pij(!)dij(!)d! = wj; (3)







3We alleviate notation by dropping summation ranges when there is no possible confusion.
6where pij(!) is the delivered price of variety !; wj is the wage rate; and Pj is the CES














The production of any variety of the dierentiated good takes place under internal in-
creasing returns to scale by a set of monopolistically competitive rms. This set is en-
dogenously determined in equilibrium by free entry and exit. We denote by ni the mass
of rms located in country i, and by N 
P
i ni the total mass of rms in the world
economy. Production of any variety of the dierentiated good requires a xed and a
constant marginal labor requirement, labeled F and c respectively. Increasing returns to
scale, costless product dierentiation, and the absence of scope economies yield a one-
to-one equilibrium relationship between rms and varieties, so we will use the two terms
interchangeably from now on.
In what follows, we assume that the trade frictions for the dierentiated good are of
the iceberg form: for one unit of any variety to arrive in country j, when shipped from
country i, ij > 1 units have to be dispatched from the country of origin. Hence, a rm
in country i has to produce xij(!)  Ljdij(!)ij units to satisfy nal demand Ljdij(!) in
country j. We also assume that trade frictions are symmetric regardless of the direction
of trade, i.e., ij = ji. Though restrictive, especially when it comes to empirical work,
this assumption is useful for deriving further insights in the general multi-country case.
The symmetry of technologies across rms and countries implies that, in equilibrium,
rms dier only by the country they are located in. Accordingly, we may simplify notation
by dropping the variety label ! from now on.











wj   Fwi (6)
with respect to all its prices pij, taking the price aggregates Pj and the wages wj as given.





The production of the homogeneous good is, on the contrary, carried out by perfectly
competitive rms under constant returns to scale. Without loss of generality, the unit
7labor requirement is normalized to one. Perfect competition implies pricing at marginal
cost, which, given the normalization of the unit input coecient, is equal to the wage.
Finally, for reasons made precise below, we assume that the homogeneous good can be
costlessly traded across all countries.
2.3 Market outcome
Technologies Free entry and exit in the dierentiated industry implies that prots are non-











j xij is the rm's total production inclusive of output lost in shipping.












; i = 1;2:::;M; (9)
where ik  
1 
ik is a measure of trade freeness, valued one when trade is free (i.e., ik = 1)
and limiting zero when trade is inhibited (i.e., ik ! 1). If (9) holds as a strict inequality
for country j, n
j = 0 in equilibrium since no rm can break even there, whereas n
j  0
otherwise.
Multiplying both sides of (9) by the positive ni and summing across countries, we
get N = L=F: in equilibrium the world mass of rms is constant and proportional to
world population. Using this result, it turns out to be convenient to rewrite condition











 1; i = 1;2;:::;M; (10)
where RMPi stands for the real market potential (henceforth, RMP) in country i, associ-
ated with the industry distribution  (see Head and Mayer, 2004).
As can be seen from expression (10), the RMP in each country generally depends
on the whole distributions of industry (), expenditure (), and factor prices (w). The
latter enters the model in a highly non-linear way and makes the analysis especially
complicated. In what follows, we therefore restrict our analysis to the case in which at
least some production of the homogeneous product takes place in all countries. When
8combined with costless trade in that good, this is a sucient condition for factor price
equalization (henceforth, FPE) to hold. Formally, factor price equalization, i.e. wi = 1
for all i = 1;2;:::;M, requires any M  1 dimensional subset of countries to be unable to
satisfy world demand for the homogeneous good (see, e.g., Baldwin et al., 2003). Let `i
be the amount of labor employed by a representative rm in country i. For homogeneous
good production to take place everywhere, the total mass of workers in each country must
exceed the total labor requirement in the dierentiated industry, i.e., Li > ni`i for all i.

















the condition for factor price equalization to hold regardless of  reduces to
i >  (11)
for all i. Put dierently, the expenditure share  on the dierentiated good must be
small enough for the homogeneous good to be produced everywhere. We assume, in what
follows, that condition (11) holds for all countries such that wj = 1 for all j. This makes
the homogeneous good a natural choice for the num eraire.
2.4 Spatial equilibrium
A spatial equilibrium is such that the RMP is equalized to one across all countries hosting
a positive measure of rms, whereas it falls short of this value in countries devoid of rms
in the dierentiated sector. In other words, all rms are equally protable in all countries
in which they operate, and they make zero prots due to free entry and exit. Formally,
the conditions for a spatial equilibrium are as follows:
RMPi = 1 if 

i > 0;
RMPi  1 if 

i = 0: (12)
The industry shares i are M endogenous unknowns, whereas the expenditure shares
i > 0, as well as the trade freeness measures 0 < ij < 1, are exogenous parameters. We








11 12  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21 22  2M
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9where T1 = T1 = 1 by denition of shares (in what follows, 1 stands for the M-
dimensional vector whose components are all equal to one). Using these denitions,
and letting diag(x) stand for the diagonal matrix obtained from the vector x, the M
equilibrium conditions (12) can be expressed in matrix notation as follows:
RMP = diag()
 1  1; (13)
with complementary slackness (RMPi   1)i = 0 for all i.
In what follows, we restrict our analysis to the meaningful case of interior equilibria,
i.e., equilibria in which every country hosts a strictly positive measure of monopolisti-
cally competitive rms. In this case, (13) holds with equality for all countries, i.e., the
equilibrium industry distribution  satises the following condition:
diag(
)
 1 = 1 or; alternatively;  = diag(')
:
Letting '   11, letting jj denote the determinant of , and letting fij (= fji by
symmetry of ) stand for the cofactor of ij, these conditions can be rewritten component











Two remarks are in order. First, countries can be thought of as nodes in the spatial
network. In this perspective, the relative size of country i, as captured by i, is a measure
of country i's relative `attraction' from the point of view of rm location. Analogously,
although 'i is a bundle of the various trade freenesses ij, it can be naturally viewed
as an inverse measure of country i's relative `accessibility' to all its trading partners (see
expression (17) below).4
For an interior equilibrium to arise, it must be that no single country can be at the same
time too `attractive' (large i) and too `accessible' (small 'i). In particular, a sucient
condition for a spatial equilibrium to be interior is that i < 'i holds for all countries
4Note that ' can be related to the Bonacich network centrality measure that has been recently used in
non-cooperative network games (Ballester et al., 2006). To see this, note that  = ^ I + G, where ^  > 0
is the common intracountry trade cost and where G is the matrix of intercountry trade costs. Then














where b( G; ^  1) is the Bonacich measure associated with the network implied by  G (the opposite of
the trade cost matrix). Therefore, quite naturally, ' is inversely linked to the Bonacich measure.
10i = 1;2;:::M (Behrens et al., 2005). Second, note that the equilibrium conditions (14)
dene a linear system with respect to the industry shares . This property is particularly
useful since it implies that there is a unique spatial equilibrium as in Krugman (1980).5
Behrens et al. (2005) have shown the following result:
Proposition 1 (existence, uniqueness, stability) When (11) holds, a unique and glob-
ally stable spatial equilibrium exists for all parameter values of the model. Furthermore,
















Proof. For the sake of clarity, we only derive the expression for the interior equilibrium
in this paper. See Behrens et al. (2005, Appendix 2) for a proof of existence, uniqueness,
and stability.
From (13), the conditions for an interior equilibrium are diag() 1 = 1. Some












Since diag() and diag( 11) are diagonal matrices, their product is commutative so






5This diers from the typical models of the `new economic geography' in which multiple equilibria
may arise due to the non-linearity of the underlying equilibrium conditions (see, e.g., Fujita et al., 1999).
Such non-linearity stems from self-reinforcing agglomeration forces, such as expenditure mobility when
rms move with workers (`backward linkages'; Krugman, 1991) or reductions in the input price indices of
intermediate goods when rms consume each others' outputs (`forward linkages'; Krugman and Venables,
1995). In our model, there are no `backward linkages' because workers are internationally immobile and
no `forward linkages' because rms do not use intermediates. Hence, there is no room for self-reinforcing











and establishes expression (15). Expression (16) can nally be obtained using the sym-
metry of .
Finally, we derive the indirect utility at the interior spatial equilibrium. The properties
of the quantity and price indices (2) and (5) ensure that PiDi =  and Hi = 1 , which
allows us to rewrite the utility (1) in indirect form as follows:
Ui = 





























































where k > 0 is a constant bundle of parameters that does not depend on i. Expression
(17) shows that i='i is a sucient statistic to assess welfare changes: a large expenditure
share i and a good access to world markets, i.e., a small value of 'i, both raise welfare in
country i. In other words, stronger attraction and better accessibility are both associated
with higher welfare.
3 Spatial networks and trade frictions
Up to now, our model is very much in the spirit of standard CES trade models with an
arbitrary number of countries. We now turn to the formal representation of the spatial
network linking the trading partners, as well as to a ner analysis of the trade frictions
ij between them. A ner analysis of both the spatial network and the trade frictions is
12intended to capture additional real-world details because spatial interactions and trade
impediments between countries are numerous and varied.
Following a standard approach in international trade and economic geography, we
assume that countries are dimensionless points. When there are only two of them, which is
the case usually considered in the literature, their relative position is irrelevant. Yet, when
there are more than two countries, and when trade frictions are not pairwise symmetric
across all countries, their relative position becomes important and must be somehow taken
into account. We believe that a natural way of thinking about a multi-country world is
in terms of spatial network, i.e., a graph.6 Each country can then be viewed as a node
of the spatial network, which is linked to the other countries via edges (which represent
transportation links). Formally, the space-economy is described by a graph (M;E), where
M = f1;2;:::Mg is the set of nodes and E the set of edges. In what follows, we denote by
(i;j) 2 E the edge linking nodes i and j in M (which may not exist). Before proceeding,
we need to dene a few concepts that we will use in the subsequent analysis.
Two countries i and j for which there exists an edge will be called neighbor countries.





linking them. A graph is said to be connected if there exists at least one path between
any pair of nodes (i;j) 2 M  M. A graph is said to be undirected if every edge can be
crossed equally in both directions. In what follows, we focus exclusively on connected and
undirected graphs with at most one edge between each pair of nodes. As is well known,
there are several special structures for these types of graphs (Harary, 1969). The following
special structure will be particularly useful in the later developments.
Denition 1 (local tree structure) A graph is locally a tree around an edge (i;j) 2 E
if there exists a unique path connecting any pair of nodes in the subset of nodes
M
0
(i;j) = fl 2 M; (l;i) 2 E or (l;j) 2 Eg:
In words, whenever a graph is locally a tree around an edge (i;j), there are no cycles in
the subset of neighboring nodes of i and j.
In order to apply the graph-theoretic approach to a spatial economy, we need to make
more precise how trade frictions aect ows between nodes. Denote by r
 1
ij 2 (0;1) the
friction of edge (i;j), which may be interpreted as the cost of crossing it: for one unit
of any variety to reach country i from country j, when using edge (i;j), rij units have
6Note that the graph representation of a spatial structure has been extensively used in other elds
like Operations Research and location theory.
13to be sent, the excess melting away en route. Hence, r
 1
ij may be viewed as a standard




ji holds. We can think of rij
as measuring all transport frictions between the two countries that arise due to, e.g., the
existence of physical distance, or geographical features, or the transportation technology.
Since countries are dimensionless points, intra-country transport frictions are assumed to
be zero, i.e., rii = 1 for all i 2 M.
Shipping between two non-neighbor countries i and j occurs along a path P of the
spatial network linking the origin with the destination country. Arbitrage by prot-
maximizing rms ensures that shipping occurs along the lowest cost route. Formally, let
Pij denote the set of all paths between i and j. Then, the transport friction between i








rlm  rik1rk1k2 :::rknj:
Note that transport frictions are, in general, not origin-destination specic. In order to
ship from country i to country j, one has to use infrastructure in third countries along the
path Pij. Yet, the third-country frictions rkl are not specic to the relationship between
i and j, since every other country shipping along this route to country j would have to
incur it equally. In other words, transport frictions are, by denition, non-discriminatory
in that no country can be excluded from changes in them.
Although transportation related costs are still not negligible, transport frictions ac-
count only for one part of total trade frictions (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2004). The
second component are what we call non-transport frictions. These frictions may include,
without being exhaustive, tari barriers, non-tari barriers (red-tape, administrative de-
lays, dierent product standards, sanitary and security requirements), and miscellaneous
barriers (dierences in languages, currency, and accounting standards). Note that, con-
trary to transport frictions, these non-transport frictions are mostly country-pair specic,
i.e., discriminatory in nature. Indeed, raising taris in country i for goods produced in
country j a priori does not apply to third countries k. Although the relative importance
of transport and non-transport frictions is often unclear and depends on the trading part-
ners, there is some evidence suggesting that non-transport frictions account for a larger
7It can be veried that the log of  constitutes an exponential network metric. Similar types of metrics
are used in general relativity and quantum mechanics. This should not come as a surprise, since it is well
known that the CES model gives rise to a `gravity equation' (e.g., Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003).
In our case, when rkl  ekl, the metric given by the log of  reduces to the standard network metric
computed on the kl (see also Behrens et al., 2005, Appendix 2).
14part of total trade frictions.8
Let tij stand for the ad valorem tari equivalent of non-transport frictions between
countries i and j. Total trade frictions are then given by ij = (1+tij)ij, with ii = 1 since
tii = 0 and ii = 1. Note that the transport friction ij is independent of tij, i.e., changes
in non-transport frictions do not induce changes in minimum cost paths. This property
will be important for the rest of our analysis.9 Finally, we assume for simplicity that
non-transport frictions are the same between two countries regardless of the directions of
trade ows (tij = tji). When taken together with the undirected network assumption, this
implies that ij = ji so that the trade cost matrix is symmetric (as imposed in Section 2).
Before proceeding with our analysis, it is worth pointing out one important aspect
related to trade frictions. Indeed, the matrix of transport frictions, dened by the ij,
and the matrix of non-transport frictions, dened by the 1+tij, dier in one fundamental
respect: while the former satises by denition the triangle inequality, the latter usually
need not do so. Consequently, the triangle inequality is not generally satised by the
matrix of total trade frictions, dened by the ij (resp., their `inverses' ij). The reason
is that non-transport frictions have no direct link with the topological properties of the
spatial network, i.e., they work as if there were direct links between any pair of countries
(all countries are neighbors). On the contrary, transport frictions have a direct link with
the topological properties of the spatial network (via the network metric), and some
countries are not neighbors. Most naturally, this fundamental dierence implies that the
eects of changes in trade frictions on industry distribution and welfare will be easier
to assess in a world with mostly transport frictions, than in a world with mostly non-
transport frictions.
8In the European Union, for example, taris were already zero at the end of the 1960s, whereas direct
frictional barriers remain relatively large even nowadays and are a matter of frequent dispute among
member states (Baldwin and Wyplosz, 2004). Furthermore, the large residuals of the gravity equation
(referred to as the `border eect') suggest that crossing an international boundary signicantly impedes
trade ows.
9Note that this property only holds if, e.g., transhipment through a country does not require the
payment of taris or any other impediments. Empirically, this seems to be the rule since taris are levied
on goods destined to the local market only (either for intermediate or for nal demand).
154 Impacts of changes in trade frictions
We now analyze how changes in trade frictions aect countries' equilibrium distribution of
activity, as well as their welfare level.10 In other words, we are interested in assessing the
impacts of changes to the freeness of trade matrix . In so doing we will, for simplicity
and to make our point most clearly, focus on two `pure' cases: (i) changes in non-transport
frictions only; and (ii) changes in transport frictions only. Considering jointly changes in
both types of frictions beclouds the analysis without adding much to our understanding
of the underlying mechanisms.
4.1 The global impacts of changes in non-transport frictions
We rst investigate how changes in non-transport frictions aect industry location and
welfare, assuming pairwise symmetric transport frictions across all countries: ij =  for
all country pairs (i;j).11 To highlight the additional insights of a multi-country setup
when compared with a two-country world we deal, in particular, with preferential trade
agreements. Put dierently, we focus on bilateral changes in non-transport frictions and
identify how they aect countries directly and indirectly.
In dealing with non-transport frictions, we assume that some `Rules of Origin' apply:
when delivered to country j, a good is certied as `Made in country i' and faces the friction
tij only if a substantial part of its value added is generated in i.12 This assumption rules
out arbitrage on non-transport costs and formally implies that the triangle inequality
holds with respect to the nal destination market (but not necessarily for the trade cost
matrix as a whole). To see this, note that shipping from i to j costs (1 + tij), whereas
shipping via k costs (1+tij)
2
> (1+tij). In other words, changes in the non-transport
friction tij do not spill over on the trade frictions faced by third countries.








1 (1 + t12)1  ::: (1 + t1M)1 
(1 + t21)1  1 ::: (1 + t2M)1 
. . .
. . . ... . . .








10See Behrens et al. (2005) for a detailed analysis on the impacts of changing market sizes .
11This assumption is not required for the results but makes their exposition much easier. The important
assumption is that the ij are held xed.
12Note that `Rules of Origin' usually apply in case of tari barriers (e.g., Feenstra, 2004, ch.6).
16where   
1 
is a strictly positive constant that we can disregard in what follows.
In the case of M = 2 countries, Krugman (1980) has shown that the larger country
always attracts rms from the smaller country when the freeness of trade increases. Fur-
thermore, such increase in the freeness of trade always raises welfare in both countries.
In other words, preferential trade liberalization between two countries isolated from the
rest of the world enhances the asymmetries between them but raises the welfare in each
of them. The foregoing result does not hold in general when the two countries are part
of a more general spatial network. This can be illustrated concisely by simple numerical
examples. Assume that M = 3 and that non-transport frictions t12 between countries 1
and 2 decrease marginally, whereas those involving country 3 (i.e., t13 and t23) remain
unchanged. Clearly, countries 1 and 2 gain better reciprocal access to the their markets,
whereas their freeness of trade with the rest of the world is unchanged.
Whether liberalizing countries gain in terms of rms and welfare depends on their
initial attraction and accessibility. If countries 1 and 2 have the same attraction as
the third country, but share superior accessibility, they both gain rms and welfare at
the expense of 3. This is the standard result highlighted in the existing literature (see,
e.g., Baldwin et al., 2003, equation (14.5)). For example, that would be the case if the



































which implies that all countries have the same size and that the non-transport frictions
between countries 2 and 3 are lower than those between them and country 1.
In general, however, both the number of rms and the level of welfare may fall in
the integrating countries. First, rms may leave the integrating countries while their
welfare still rises. To see this, suppose that expenditure in the high non-transport friction



































In this case preferential trade liberalization between countries 1 and 2 would decrease
the number of rms in the integrating area while increasing it in the rest of the world.
This may be explained as follows. Consider denition (10), with wi = wj = wk = 1,
17which predicts rms' prots in country i for any given distribution  of rms. A marginal
increase in 12, taking  as given, raises both the numerator and the denominator of
RMPi for i = 1;2. The former eect stems from the fact that rms in the integrating
countries enjoy freer reciprocal access to each other's consumers. The latter eect stems
from the fact that rms in the integrating countries also suer from tougher competition
from each other's rms. In this example, the former eect is dominated by the latter, so
that some rms must leave the integrating area in equilibrium.13
Second, welfare may even fall in the integrating countries. Suppose that the initial





























Then, we obtain that welfare falls in country 1 and rises in country 2, implying that one
of the integrating countries experiences welfare losses, which never occurs in the case of
M = 2. This result is driven by the presence of the hub eect: being geographically
advantageously located, country 2 attracts rms and gains welfare at the expense of the
peripheral country 1. It is reminiscent of the `two-tier home market eect' of Baldwin et
al. (2003): rms are attracted towards the integrating block (`rst tier') but they pick
the larger country of the block (`second tier'). The dierence is that in our case changes
in the integrating block are driven by accessibility dierences instead of unequal market
size ( is held xed here).
Although general theoretical results are hard to come by, we can derive one for the special
case of M = 3 countries. Indeed, the next proposition shows that when M = 3 the
excluded country always loses: @U
3=@12 < 0 at any interior equilibrium.14
Proposition 2 (harmful exclusion) When there are M = 3 countries, reducing non-
transport frictions between two countries always harms the excluded one, provided the
equilibrium distributions before and after integration are interior.
13It is worth noting that this result is highly reminiscent of the `merger paradox'. When two countries
`merge', their `market share' (i.e., their mass of rms), may decrease.
14Note, that Proposition 2 holds for interior solutions only. Once we take into account the fact that
trade integration may well lead to corner solution, the analysis become even more involved. We present
an example of such a case in Appendix 1.
18Proof. It is readily veried that the numerator of @U
3=@12 is quadratic in 12, while
the denominator is positive. Solving @U
3=@12 = 0 yields
12 =
13   2
13 + 23   2
23  (13   23)
p
 2(1   13)(1   23)(13 + 23)
13 + 23   21323
;
which is clearly a complex number since 13;23 2 (0;1). Hence, @U
3=@12 does not
change sign. One can verify that sgn(@U
3=@12) =  sgn(@'3=@12) < 0 when evaluated
at 12 = 13 = 23 2 (0;1). Hence, the derivative is always negative, which proves the
result.
To sum up, there are complex mechanisms at work when there are more than two coun-
tries. This complexity should not come as a surprise since it is well known in trans-
portation science that changes in network structure or edge capacities have multiple im-
plications and may yield counterintuitive results (see, e.g., the so-called Braess paradox;
Braess, 1968). The three examples presented in the foregoing, as well as that developed in
Appendix 1, suce to show that even in the simplest setting with M = 3, general results
are extremely dicult to establish from a theoretical point of view without imposing at
least some restrictions on  and . Whether `realistic' examples, using plausible values
for ,  and , also may give rise to such counterintuitive results is not a priori clear. To
answer this question would require extensive numerical analysis and simulation of coun-
terfactuals using a real-world data calibrated version of the model, a task that we reserve
for future work.
4.2 The local impacts of changes in transport frictions
As shown in the previous section, it is hardly possible to obtain general results on the
impact of changes in non-transport frictions when there are more than two countries. The
underlying reason is twofold: (i) the network may be viewed as fully connected, i.e., the
matrix  has M M independent parameters; and (ii) there is, in general, no relationship
between  and the topology of the network since  does not derive from a metric. Yet,
if we abstract from non-transport frictions and solely focus on transport frictions, the
natural restrictions on  deriving from the metric can be used to obtain a richer set of
results. Furthermore, the matrix  has less than M M independent parameters, which
also signicantly simplies the analysis.15
15In the case of a tree there are, for example, 3M   2 < M2 independent parameters when M > 2.
The reduction in the number of independent parameters becomes very signicant for large networks.
19To illustrate how changes in transport frictions aect the distribution of industry
and the level of welfare, we sterilize dierences in non-transport frictions by assuming
tij = t. Hence, changes in trade frictions ij are due to changes in transport frictions ij
only.16 This implies that, because  is a metric, the triangle inequality holds both with
respect to the destination market and for the trade cost matrix (ij): formally, (1+t)ij 
































where 0  (1+t)1  is a strictly positive constant that we can disregard in what follows.
Note that the graph associated with this matrix need now not be fully connected, because
there may be no edges between some country pairs (think, e.g., of shipping from Germany
to Spain, which requires passing through France). The reason is that the ij are minimum
cost paths, which in general do not have direct links between the origin and the destination
countries (except when they are neighbors). As a result, the impact of changing rkl (as
given in Section 3) on the spatial equilibrium will strongly depend on the topological
properties of the transportation network in the vicinity of the edge subject to change.
One of the strongest structures a graph can exhibit is that of a tree, which is an
undirected graph in which there is a unique path between any pair of nodes (Harary,
1969). Although the strict assumption of a tree is too strong with respect to real-world
spatial networks, many networks have a structure that closely mimics that of a tree.17
Figure 1 depicts an example of a graph with 9 nodes (countries) and 10 edges (shipping
routes).
16As in the previous section, symmetry is not generally required for the results to hold. It only makes
their exposition much easier. The key assumption is that the tij's are held xed.
17In particular, all multi-hub networks are tree-like structures, e.g., the international airline network
for both passengers and cargo. It is also of interest to note that tree-like networks emerge as the optimal
design outcome of economic problems in which total transport costs are minimized when agents care not
only about distance but also about the number of nodes they have to cross (Gastner and Newman, 2004).
This is in particular so when crossing nodes involves additional costs as in the cases of re-containerization
in ports or connecting ights in airports.
20As can be seen from Figure 1, the `left part' of the graph (nodes 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5) form
a tree-like structure, whereas the `right part' displays a more complex pattern. Recalling
Denition 1 in Section 3, one can verify that the graph depicted in Figure 1 is locally a
tree around the edges (1;3), (2;3), (3;4), and (4;5), whereas it is not around any other
edge. Note also that the local tree property implies that the edge (i;j) is a bottleneck of
the graph, since some trade ows must necessarily ow through this edge no matter the
(nite) value of transport friction rij.
By Denition 1, a sub-graph forming locally a tree diers from a general spatial net-
work in that there are no cycles, i.e., shipping routes are always uniquely determined. For
instance, shipping from country 1 to country 6 necessarily implies transhipment through
the transit countries 3 and 4, which then implies that 16 = 133446. This corresponds
to an extreme case where the triangle inequality ij  ikkj, or equivalently ij  ikkj,
holds as an equality. Moreover, there is no room for international arbitrage since no rm
in country k can earn prots by importing goods from country i and re-exporting them
to country j.
Although, as shown in Section 4.1, no general results on the eects of economic integra-
tion can be derived in a general spatial network with respect to changes in non-transport
21frictions, we can prove three strong results relating to changes in the transport frictions
when the network is locally a tree at (i;j). To begin with, we prove that the impact of a
change in ij is localized.
Lemma 1 (localized impacts of changes in transport frictions) Assume that the
spatial network (M;E) is locally a tree at (i;j), and let M0
(i;j) denote the subset of neigh-





for all l 2 M0





for all k 2 M n M0
(i;j).
Proof. See Appendix 2.
Lemma 1 shows that when the spatial structure is locally described by a tree, reductions
in transport frictions matter most for nearby countries. In particular, such improvements
always reduce the rm shares in excluded neighboring countries without aecting excluded
non-neighboring countries. In other words, whereas changes in non-transport frictions
have global eects, changes in transport frictions have only local eects in a tree. For
example, in Figure 1, when (i;j) = (3;4) we have M0
(3;4) = f1;2;3;4;5;6g. A change in
45 `spills over' on 
1 to 
6, while the remaining shares 
7 to 
11 are left unchanged.
Lemma 1 allows us to prove the following result:
Proposition 3 (inow of rms) Assume that the spatial network (M;E) is locally a









Proof. When transport frictions are reduced between i and j, by Lemma 1 all neigh-
boring countries lose some industry, whereas the other countries are unaected. Since the
shares 
i sum to one, it then must be that the integrating block increases its industry
share at the expense of the excluded countries.
Proposition 3 states that reductions in transport frictions increase the total industry
share 
i + 
j of the integrating countries if the spatial network is locally a tree. Note,
however, that the individual shares 
i and 
j do not necessarily both rise. If 
i is much
larger than 
j, the former rises and the latter falls. The reason is the two-tier home-
market eect, which is a typical manifestation of the result that the shorter the distance
22from a large country, the greater the decrease in the numbers of rms in neighboring
countries. Accordingly, reductions in transport frictions between large and small countries
can decrease the attractiveness of the small country. We may call such a phenomenon a
`straw eect', because economic activities migrate to large countries through new highways
and infrastructure as juice in a glass is sucked up by a straw.
Our third and last result concerns the welfare eects of reductions in transport frictions
when the network is locally a tree:
Proposition 4 (Pareto improvement) Assume that the spatial network (M;E) is lo-
cally a tree at (i;j). A decrease in the transport friction rij raises the welfare of both
countries i and j, whereas it does not change the welfare of all the remaining countries.
Proof. See Appendix 3.
Proposition 4 shows that, despite the straw eect, consumers in both integrating countries
i and j are always better o due to reductions in transport frictions rij. That is, the
increase in the freeness of trade is not only jointly desirable for the two countries, but also
Pareto dominant in spite of the fact that one of the countries may lose rms. The fact
that welfare in third countries is unaected contrasts with the result obtained when trade
integration happens through the reduction of non-transport frictions (Proposition 2).
This dierence is due to the fact that reductions in transport frictions between any two
countries i and j cannot be `preferential', as improved links are used also for shipments
to and from all other countries.
To understand the intuition underlying this result, consider Figure 1. For simplicity,
assume that ij = 1=5 for all edges (i;j) and that i = 1=9 for all nodes. The spatial
equilibrium and the associated utilities are then given by

 = (0:09 0:09 0:15 0:12 0:09 0:17 0:08 0:08 0:11)
u
 = (0:13 0:13 0:22 0:22 0:13 0:26 0:15 0:15 0:19):
Countries 3, 4 and 6 naturally attract more industry due to their `central' location in
the network. Note also that country 4 has less industry, since it lies in the `shadow' of
countries 3 and 6. Yet, having good consumer access to the varieties produced in both
countries 3 and 6, it oers the same utility as country 3 in equilibrium. Consider now
an improvement in the link between countries 3 and 4 and assume that 34 increases
to 2=5. This will drain rms from the neighboring countries 1, 2, 5 and 6, whereas the
non-neighboring countries 7, 8 and 9 are unaected. Straightforward computation shows
23that the new spatial equilibrium and the new utilities are given by

 = (0:08 0:08 0:18 0:15 0:08 0:16 0:08 0:08 0:11)
u
 = (0:13 0:13 0:29 0:29 0:13 0:26 0:15 0:15 0:19):
How can we explain that a country loses industry yet sees its welfare unaected? Consider
the case of country 5. There is a negative and a positive eect of an increase in 34. First,
there is the loss of local industry, which decreases consumer welfare since these varieties
must now be imported. This loss of industry is triggered by the relocation of competing
rms from countries 1, 2 and 6 towards the better accessible countries 3 and 4, which
makes competition for rms in country 5 in these markets ercer, and thus less protable.
Second, there is the positive eect of an overall better access to all varieties produced
in countries 1, 2, 3 and 4, due to the relocation of rms. This makes imports cheaper
and, therefore, raises welfare in country 5. In equilibrium, these two eects oset each
other, so that welfare in country 5 does not change. Stated dierently, average consumer
access to all varieties remains the same, despite the relocation of domestic rms. The
crucial dierence with changes in non-transport barriers, as analyzed in Section 4.1, is
that country 5 also benets from the change in 34 because this improvement is not
specic to countries 3 and 4. Could country 5 be excluded from this improvement, only
the negative eect would survive and the change would not be Pareto improving.
Note, nally, that this strong result does not hold for link improvements that occur
on portions of the graph where it is not locally a tree, such as 46 and 67. This is
because the presence of cycles generates feedbacks in the network which do aect third
countries. These results have been highlighted in Section 4.1 using some simple examples
with M = 3.
5 Conclusion
We have analyzed how decreases in transport and non-transport costs aect the location
of rms, the structure of trade, and the welfare of nations. Our multi-country model with
transportation network reveals that the consequences of deepening economic integration
are very likely to depend on which components of trade costs actually decrease. Whereas
changes in non-transport costs seem to have global impacts, the impacts of reductions in
transport costs are likely to be localized.
These ndings have important policy implications. In a comparable model with freely
mobile capital, Baldwin et al. (2003, Ch.14.3) show that a custom union unambiguously
24leads to an inow of industry into the union, welfare gains for the members, and welfare
losses for the non-members. We have shown that those clear-cut results stem from: (i) a
common external tari that custom unions impose whereas preferential trade agreements
do not; (ii) identical transport costs between any pair of countries. Otherwise, preferential
trade liberalization may harm not only excluded but also some member countries. This
suggests that successful preferential trade agreements also require at least some coordi-
nation with respect to infrastructural projects.
For example, due to dierential transport costs, European integration may have a neg-
ative impact not only on excluded countries but also on small or remote member countries.
Accordingly, contrary to standard beliefs, eastern enlargement might be detrimental not
to incumbent members but rather to the newcomers, which are all characterized by far
smaller markets. Even if factor price dierences may lead to the relocation of standard-
ized production processes to the new member countries, market-size dependent R&D,
services or knowledge intensive production processes may well relocate to the incumbent
countries, thereby harming long-run development of the newcomers. Analyzing these im-
portant questions requires dropping the assumption of factor price equalization, which is
left for future work.
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Appendix 1: Changes in non-transport costs and cor-
ner solutions
Consider the following simple example with M = 3 countries. Before integration, the


























Assume that countries 1 and 2 remove all barriers to trade. Hence, everything works as
if they would form only a single country after integration.18 Their access to country 3 is








































In both cases, jdiag(((2)) 11)j = 0 so that we cannot compute the equilibrium. This is because the new
equilibrium will be a corner solution, whereas the matrix equations in Proposition 1 characterize interior
equilibria only.



















Hence, the equilibrium is interior before integration, but corner after. In particular, the
integrating area loses its industry. To see that Proposition 2 does not apply in this case,
























This shows that countries 1 and 2 lose rms, whereas country 1 loses and country 2 gains
welfare. Furthermore, country 3 clearly gains both rms and welfare, which shows that
Proposition 2 does not apply to corner solutions.
Appendix 2: Proof of Lemma 1
Assume that the transportation network is locally a tree at (i;j). We compute in the
following order: (i) fik with (i;k) = 2 E; (ii) fiin with (i;in) 2 E; (iii) fii, in order to
(iv) obtain @
k=@rij; and (v) @
iin=@rij. Let i1;:::;im be the set of countries that have
an indirect link with j via i, and let j0;:::;jm0 be the set of countries that have an
indirect link with i via j. Without loss of generality, we may set k = j0, assume that
(j;j0) 2 E, and order countries as follows: i;j;i1;:::;im;k(= j0);j1;:::;jm0. Hence, the














1 ij ii1  iim ik ij1  ijm0
ji 1 ji1  jim jk jj1  jjm0










imi imj imi1  1 imk imj1  imjm0
ki kj ki1  kim 1 kj1  kjm0
























(i) The cofactor fik is the signed determinant of the submatrix extracted from  by
deleting row i and column k. Dropping the multiplicative coecient ( 1)
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Since rki = rkjrji when the network is locally a tree around (i;j), we have that ki =
kjji. Therefore, we can multiply row j by kj and subtract it from row k. This
operation yields 0 for the rst im + 2 elements. Applying the same transformation to
rows k;j1;:::;jm0 gives the same result. Likewise, we can multiply column j by jj1 and
subtract it from column j1, which yields 0 for the rst im + 1 elements. Applying the
same transformation to columns j2;:::;jm0 gives the same result. Putting together all
these operations shows that, dropping the multiplicative constant ( 1)



















ji 1 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jim 0   0





. . . 0   0
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0    0    
0    0    
0    0    
0    0    
0    0    



















where  denotes a non-zero element whose exact expression is of no particular interest to
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and where 21 is (1 + m0)(1 + m) zero matrix. Using the Schur complement (see Horn
and Johnson, 1985, p.22), we have
fik = j11j







because j21j = j22j = 0.
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where the rst expression is obtained by exchanging the rst two columns, and the second
expression is obtained by dividing column j by ij and subtracting it from column i.
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However, we have shown in (i) above that the cofactors of the last two terms in the
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Since jj is common to the numerator and denominator of fkl=
P
n fnl, conditions (20),
(21) and (22) show that this coecient is a function of kl and nl only when (k;l) 2 E
and (n;l) 2 E. However, since by assumption (k;i) = 2 E and (k;j) = 2 E, the coecient
does not contain ij. Hence, @
k=@rij = 0, which proves the second part of the lemma.













Using conditions (21) and (22), we get
fiini
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ij = r
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which establishes the rst part of the lemma.
Appendix 3: Proof of Proposition 4
(i) From (17), we know that the indirect utility U

































































which implies that @U
i =@ij > 0, and hence @U
i =@rij < 0 for all i 6= j.
(ii) Since 'i is a function of il (l = j;i1;:::;in) only, we readily get @U
k=@ij =
@U
k=@rij = 0 for all k 6= i;j.
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